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Abstract—Security analysis methods can provide correct yet
meaningless results if the assumptions underlying the model
do not conform to reality. We present an approach to analyze
the security of software-intensive system architectures that
focusses on making these underlying assumptions explicit, so
that they can be taken into account. Starting from an Alloy
model of a software architecture, a set of constraints is elicited
by leveraging model relaxation techniques. These constraints
form a minimal but sufficient condition that the system must
meet in order to realise its security requirements. As the
approach starts from the minimal guarantees that the system
environment offers, it does not depend on an explicit attacker
model and can take arbitrary attacker behaviour into account.
As it is iterative, it is possible to constructively integrate the
approach in a secure software development life cycle. Our
results are illustrated by means of a case study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Creating a software architecture is a key step in devel-
oping a successful software system, as it is essential in
ensuring that the resulting system realizes certain qualities,
such as performance, adaptability and security [1]. Also,
early studies have shown that it is five to one hundred times
cheaper to fix fundamental flaws in the system early on
[2], making architectural analysis more cost-effective than
finding and fixing bugs after the software is deployed. Given
the rising importance of software security, analyzing the
security properties of a system on the architectural level is
therefore paramount.
Methods to analyze the security of a software architecture
can be roughly grouped in two categories: formal methods
(e.g., [3]) and threat modelling (e.g., [4]). When an analysis
method states that an architecture is secure, the result is al-
ways relative to the set of assumptions used. Clearly, if these
assumptions are not realistic, the result is formally correct
but practically meaningless. In threat modeling approaches,
assumptions are implicitly made by the analysts while
assessing the relevance of a potential threat to a system.
For instance, the threat that information is disclosed over a
connection is discarded because that communication channel
is behind a firewall. In formal methods, the assumptions
are embedded in the model used for the analysis and are
often implicit. For instance, availability weaknesses are not
discovered if the model can not represent the case of failing
components. In both cases, there is no explicit enumeration
of the complete set of assumptions that are necessary to back
up the analysis result and to build a supporting assurance
argument. This work focusses primarily on this concern,
which is neglected in the state of the art.
This paper presents a formal architectural modelling and
analysis method that iteratively constructs the set of as-
sumptions (called the context) which is required by the
system to operate correctly. We provide an analysis method
that formally verifies that the system model upholds the
security requirements in light of the stated assumptions. The
security analyst can use the context as an explicit target
of assessment in a risk management process. The context
refines the important, yet vague question “Is my system
secure?”, to a more practical one, “Is the expected context
matched by reality?”. Additionally, the application deployer
can use the context as a checklist of properties that the
deployment environment should uphold for the application
to be deployed securely.
Our approach is illustrated in Figure 1. First, from the
architectural documentation (which is supposed to contain
at least information on the system decomposition, the de-
ployment description and the functional scenarios), a formal
model in Alloy is derived (see the top part of the figure).
The model is created in accordance to the meta-model,
which provides architectural abstractions such as compo-
nents, connectors, and so on. The security requirements are
also formally modelled as Alloy assertions. Then, via a
model finding technique, a context is iteratively built which
contains a formalization of all the assumptions that are
necessary for the requirements to be realized. The context
is constructed by iterating over all automatically gener-
ated counterexamples that violate the requirements of the
modelled architecture, debunking the implicit assumptions
that made these scenarios feasible, and explicitly adding
constraints to the context to prevent these counterexample
from occurring (see arrow 1). These constraints represent
the expectations on the deployment environment (e.g., the
security guarantees provided by the middleware), on the 3rd
party security solutions integrated in the architecture (e.g.,
an authorization engine), and on the internal parts of the
system that are not explicitly modelled at the current level
of refinement.
Every constraint in the context documents something that
the architect explicitly takes for granted in the current formal
model. It is then up to the security analyst to accept these
assumptions, or to ask the architect to extend or refine
the architecture with additional mechanisms so that the
assumption becomes superfluous (see arrow 2). Note that,
as the abstractions in the formal model (which are also used
in the counterexamples) are very close to the abstractions
used in the architectural model, it is easy to interpret the
counterexamples and to map the results of the analysis back
to the actual issues in the architectural model. Therefore,
the proposed approach provides constructive support to the
architect as well.
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Figure 1. An overview of the approach. The black rectangles denote input
files, the arrows denote the steps in our methodology. Sections describing
a particular step are marked.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II describes
our architectural meta-model, introduces Alloy as the target
formalism for our analysis, and shows how architectural
descriptions are mapped to Alloy. Section III introduces
model relaxation and its impact on verifying the system
security requirements. The analysis process and the iterative
construction of the context are outlined in Section IV. The
class of weaknesses that can be discovered are discussed in
Section V and compared to related work in Section VI. We
conclude in Section VII.
II. A SECURITY-ORIENTED MODEL OF SOFTWARE
ARCHITECTURES
This section introduces the security-centric software ar-
chitectural model used during the remainder of this paper.
In order to illustrate the approach, we apply it to a case
in which an online shop needs to securely log transactions,
i.e., logged transactions should not be modified nor deleted
without being detected. For brevity, only the key parts of
the case are presented.
A. Important architectural views
Software architectures are documented in terms of dif-
ferent views, with each view consisting of one or more
models [5]. For the purpose of security analysis, we propose
a meta-model (based on the “4+1” views from Kruchten [6])
that incorporates information from the physical, logical and
scenario view. Information from the development view is
disregarded, as we focus on the security of a system running
in a specific deployment environment and less on how the
system was constructed. While our approach does not re-
quire precisely these views (based on available architectural
documentation, less or more information could be included
in the analysis), we find that they are a practical choice,
given the wide acceptance of the “4+1” model on which they
are based. We return to this topic in Section V. The view-
types are applied to the online shop case study in Figure 2
using UML2 notation.
(a) Logical view. (b) Physical view.
(c) Scenario view.
Figure 2. Different views on the online shop.
The logical view captures the component model of the
system. As shown in Figure 2(a), the logical view of the
online shop consists of a Shop component, which realizes
the functionality expected by the shop’s customers, and a
Logger component, which realizes the security requirements
imposed on the transaction log. Such a solution could
have been selected from a catalog of security mechanisms,
such as the Secure Logger security pattern from [7]. The
Logger exposes two interfaces, one public LogIF which
is used by components that need to log messages, and a
private LogAdminIF which is used by the AdminConsole.
The AdminConsole component represents the dashboard
that the shop administrator uses to read the log, and to
verify that it is still intact. The main purpose of including
information from the logical view in the model is to enable
the functional modelling of the system (i.e., to create a model
that simulates the behaviour of the final system, up to a
certain level of abstraction). As such, the logical view has a
supporting function, and does not help in uncovering security
weaknesses directly.
The scenario view illustrates how the elements in the other
views work together by the use of a small set of important
scenarios, which are instances of more general use cases.
Figure 2(c) captures the scenario of buying an item from
the shop. The customer adds items to the shopping cart,
after which the cart is checked out. The Shop calculates the
total cost, and returns this to the customer. The customer
pays the specified amount, after which the transaction is
logged by the Shop via the Logger. This view builds upon
the foundations in the logical view to allow reasoning about
what the system should do. It shows which model elements
are relevant for the execution of a system operation and
enable tracing the impact of low-level security properties
to a global impact on the functionality of the system. For
instance, the impact of the inability of the Logger to log
messages is made clear in Figure 2(c), which shows that
the log operation is used in the implementation of the pay-
operation of the online shop. In general, the scenario view
allows reasoning about architectural security properties such
as full mediation, ordering of operations and timing issues
such as race conditions.
The physical view describes the mapping of the software
onto the hardware and reflects its distributed aspects. In
Figure 2(b), three nodes are relevant to the shopping system.
The customer’s browser machine (hosting the browser pro-
cess which is not depicted) is attached to the server (hosting
both the Shop and the Logger process) via the Internet.
The Shop and Logger are connected via a local connector,
which we model as a link, since UML2 lacks explicit
connector semantics. The AdminConsole executes on the
administrator’s desktop, and is connected to the server via a
private intranet. The physical view is the main driver of the
security analysis process. The information contained therein
allows reasoning about security issues such as data and
communication integrity, data flow properties, availability of
nodes and links, and the introduction of malicious entities
in the deployment environment. For instance, Figure 2(b)
allows the analysis to reason about data flow between the
customer’s browser and the Shop, as it shows where these
processes are hosted and which communication channels are
available to exchange this data.
B. Alloy
Alloy is a modelling language based on first-order
logic [8]. The Alloy Analyzer is a constraint solver that
provides fully automatic simulation and checking by finding
model instances that correspond to a certain model de-
scription. Furthermore, the analyzer is able to automatically
verify model properties and visualise counterexamples. In
order to make the analysis tractable, however, the modeller
has to provide an explicit scope, i.e., the number of instances
of types defined in that model that are used in the analysis.
Only counterexamples within that scope will be found. We
use Alloy as it is designed explicitly with object-oriented
analysis in mind, facilitating the adoption by the software
architect.
As opposed to model checking, where all reachable states
of a complete model are visited, model finding takes a set of
constraints and finds all models within the scope that uphold
these constraints. This is key to taking unforeseen attacks
into account, and removing the need for an explicit attacker
model. How this is leveraged is shown in Section IV. Also,
as Alloy supports analyzing incomplete models, a more
flexible integration of our approach in the development
process is possible (i.e., the architect can perform an initial
analysis on a partial architectural model).
C. Integrating architectural views in an Alloy meta-model
We facilitate the creation of architectural models in Al-
loy by providing an architectural meta-model, depicted in
Figure 3, that incorporates the three architectural views
described in Section II-A.
Logical
Figure 3. An architectural meta-model in Alloy.
The concepts presented in the meta-model represent a
proper subset of UML that we expect the architectural
description to adhere to. A software architecture as described
in Section II-A is mapped to our Alloy meta-model as
follows. The mapping of logical and physical elements is
straight-forward. An architectural component, interface and
operation are mapped to their namesake types in Alloy, as
are UML nodes and links. Architectural connectors are a
bit more problematic, as there is no first-class connector in
UML. We assume that a connector must be present between
two (or more) components, i.e., connect those components,
before they can interact. Furthermore, if a connector exists
between components on different nodes, then there must
be a corresponding link between those nodes to host the
connector. These assumptions are sufficiently generic that
they are applicable to every component-based system.
A complete presentation of our Alloy meta-model is not
possible due to space limitations1. As an illustration, the
modelling process is applied to the parts of Figure 2 marked
by a dashed rectangle.
Concerning Figure 2(a), the Logger and Shop components
are modelled as follows. Note that Connector, Link and
Node are defined in the meta-model file (metamodel.als) and
omitted for brevity.
1 sig Logger extends Component {} // A ‘sig’ is a type in Alloy.
2 // Alloy supports inheritance, denoted by the ‘extends’ keyword.
3 // For instance, in this fragment, both Shop and Logger are
4 // specializations of the Component type (not defined here).
5 sig Shop extends Component {
6 logger: Logger one →Time // ‘logger’ is an attribute of Shop.
7 // It contains a reference to a logger−instance.
8 }
9 sig Log extends Operation {} // Log is an operation
10 sig LogIF extends Interface {}{ // LogIF is an interface.
11 // The LogIF is realized by the Logger, and contains
12 // only one method (i.e., ‘Log’). The methods and realizedBy
13 // relationships are defined in (and inherited from) Interface.
14 methods = Log and realizedBy = Logger
15 }
Before the Shop and Logger components can be detailed,
we need to define the types that are used in their definition.
As shown in the LogIF (line 10), the Logger accepts
Messages via the Log operation. Internal to the Logger
component, a logged message is represented in a different
format (e.g., a sequence number is added). These additional
details can be derived from the description of the adopted
solution (e.g., the Secure Logger pattern [7]). To this aim, the
ProcessedMessage type is introduced (line 16). According to
a similar rationale, the SignedMessage type (which denotes
a digitally signed ProcessedMessage) must be introduced
as well (line 22). It contains a reference to the current
ProcessedMessage (line 23), the signedContent (line 24),
i.e., the ProcessedMessage that was originally signed, as
well as the Principal that signed the message (line 25). A
SignedMessage is valid at a certain point in time when the
content matches the signed content, and it was signed by
the LoggerEntity. This is captured in the isValid predicate
on line 30. Note that the above Alloy description of the
Secure Logger pattern could be provided to the modeller
via a library.
16 sig ProcessedMessage {
17 // ‘content’ is a relation from one Message to Time atoms.
18 content: Message one →Time,
19 // Similarly, ‘id’ is a relation from one integer to time.
1The complete, extensively documented Alloy source files can be found
at http://people.cs.kuleuven.be/thomas.heyman/alloy/.
20 id: Int one →Time
21 }
22 sig SignedMessage {
23 content: ProcessedMessage one →Time,
24 signedContent: ProcessedMessage one →Time,
25 signedBy: Principal one →Time
26 }
27 // This defines a predicate on instances of SignedMessage,
28 // with one Time ‘t’ as argument. Note that, as in Java,
29 // the current instance is accessible with the keyword ‘this’.
30 pred SignedMessage.isValid(t:Time) {
31 // In Alloy, relationships can be navigated using ‘.’.
32 this.content.t.content.t = this.signedContent.t.content.t
33 this.signedBy.t = LoggerEntity
34 }
Now that the necessary types have been introduced, the
previous definition of the Logger can be completed with the
attribute shown in Figure 2 (i.e., a mutable list of signed
messages) as follows.
35 sig Logger extends Component {
36 // ‘contains’ attributes a variable list of SignedMessage
37 // instances to every Logger instance.
38 contains: set SignedMessage →Time
39 }
As Alloy is based on first-order logic, it does not have a
built-in notion of time. As such, time is explicitly modelled
as a set of discrete, ordered Time instances. Associations
(such as the set of nodes connected by one link) can be
made mutable by adding a relationship with the Time set
(i.e., the ‘connects’ relationship between a Node and a Link
in Figure 3 is in {Node× Link × Time}).
Central to the scenario view is the Invocation, which
can be created by the calling component (i.e., invoked) and
consumed by the receiving component (i.e., executed). Once
an invocation is invoked, it is buffered in a connector. When
it is consumed by the receiving component, it is removed
from the connector. The details of these semantics are are
included in the meta-model (metamodel.als) and not shown
here.
40 sig Invocation {
41 of: one Operation,
42 args: set univ,
43 // The caller, as expressed ‘on the wire’.
44 caller: lone Component,
45 // The component that sent the original invocation.
46 orig caller: one Component,
47 receivers: set Component, // The receiving components.
48 invoked: lone Time, // The time of invocation (if any).
49 executed: lone Time // The time of execution (if any).
50 }
An equivalence relationship is defined between invocations
with identical senders and receivers, the same operation, and
the same invocation time. This allows analyzing situations
where an invocation is swapped for an equivalent one,
e.g., one with the same logical caller (line 46) but actually
sent by a different physical caller (line 44), as is the case
when an invocation is routed through different intermediary
components, for instance.
Every operation is coupled to its behavioural specification
by adding an extra fact to the model. In architectural
terms, this corresponds to associating a request received at a
component interface to the internal implementation of such
an operation. For instance, consider the Logger which offers
a Log operation. Suppose that the specification of the Log
operation is contained in the predicate Logger.write, then
the Log operation is coupled to this specification as follows
(note line 65).
51 pred Logger.write(m:Message, t:Time) {
52 // ‘some’ represents existential quantification in Alloy.
53 some pm:ProcessedMessage, s:SignedMessage {
54 pm.content.t = m and s.content.t = pm
55 s.sign[LoggerEntity,t] and s in this.contains.t
56 }}
57 pred Logger.log(callr:Component, m:Message, t:Time) {
58 // The Call predicate creates a corresponding Invocation.
59 Invoke[callr,this,Log,m,t] }
60 sig Logger extends Component { ... }{
61 // ‘all’ represents universal quantification.
62 all t:Time | some c:Component,arg:univ |
63 // The Execute predicate is true whenever a
64 // corresponding Invocation is executed.
65 Execute[c,this,Log,arg,t] ⇒ this.write[arg,t]
66 }
The Shop is now able to invoke the Log operation by calling
Logger.log(this,m,t), with m the message contents,
and t the current time instance. Note that, since Alloy does
not offer reflection, it is not possible to couple the behaviour
of an operation directly to the instance of an Operation
model element.
The architect can instruct the Alloy Analyzer to generate
instances of the model with the command run {} for 3.
This will visualise arbitrary model instances within a scope
of 3 (i.e., with a maximum of three component instances,
three connector instances, three times, etc.). Larger scopes
allow reasoning over more complex instances, while increas-
ing analysis overhead. By checking that the model still has
instances within the current context, the architect can verify
that the model is realizable (i.e., that there are no internal
contradictions). This check enforces the consistency of our
approach.
D. Security requirements
Supposing that the rest of the system of Figure 2 is
similarly modelled, it is now possible to express and verify
the security requirements of the Logger. We assume that
the security requirements are expressed in terms of the
interface exposed by the respective component (as in [3]).
The integrity requirement that messages written to the log
should not be deleted, is modelled as an assertion.
67 assert NoDeletion {
68 all t:Time,m:Message,s:Shop | (s.logger.t).log[s,m,t] implies (
69 some pm:ProcessedMessage,t1:t.nexts + t {
70 pm.content.t1 = m and all t2:Time | t2.gte[t1] implies
71 (s.logger.t2).checkForEntry[pm,t2] or
72 (s.logger.t2).isIntact[0,t2]
73 })}
Note that the checkForEntry and isIntact predicates rep-
resent the implementation of the Read, resp. Verify opera-
tions. The predicate checkForEntry is true if the specified
processed message is present in the log at that time, and
isIntact is true whenever the boolean flag (0 for false, 1 for
true) matches the perceived status of the log. In other words,
the NoDeletion requirement asserts that an invocation of the
Log operation from a Shop results in a correct state of the
Logger.
The architect can verify whether the NoDeletion require-
ment holds with the command check NoDeletion for
n, which would exhaustively explore every model instance
within a scope of n. If it does not hold, a counterexam-
ple can be visualised. This counterexample represents an
attack against the model. The absence of counterexamples
guarantees that the requirements follow logically from the
model, within the specified scope. This check enforces that
the model is complete w.r.t. the current level of refinement.
E. Meta-model revisited
As the meta-model describes a very generic architectural
model, it is easily extended to conform to specific applica-
tion deployment environments. But, more importantly, this
genericness ensures that all weaknesses that are present in
a more specific model (with more constraints), also occur
in this general one. In the default model, the following
properties are assumed not to hold. Liveness and at-most-
once invocation semantics. It might be that one invocation
gives rise to a repeated execution of the corresponding
operation, or no execution at all. In-order message delivery
or other timing-related properties are also not taken for
granted. Furthermore, all modelled entities are not consid-
ered static—components can dynamically be added to or
removed from a connector, communication links can fail and
new ones can be introduced, etc.
Most importantly, models are not assumed to be com-
pletely described. During analysis, arbitrary unnamed enti-
ties such as components and nodes will be introduced. As
the only thing that is taken for granted are the constraints
expressed by the architect, the analysis on such a generic
model will uncover every configuration of model entities
that violate the specified requirements, within the constraints
imposed by the modeller. This effectively factors out an
explicit attacker model, and shifts the focus to a realistic
modelling of the deployment environment. This is the topic
of the next section.
III. UNCOVERING HIDDEN ASSUMPTIONS THROUGH
MODEL RELAXATION
The modeller may implicitly introduce constraints that are
too strong for the deployment environment and that might
fail at run-time. In these cases, a positive result from the
security analysis is not reliable as the architecture is “secure”
only vis-a-vis a set of unrealistic assumptions. Hence, the
analysis tool might even create a counter-productive, ill-
grounded belief of security.
Consider, for instance, the following alternative defini-
tion of a SignedMessage in which the reference to time-
variability has been dropped.
74 sig SignedMessage { ...
75 content: one ProcessedMessage // was ‘‘→ Time’’
76 }
This definition silently assumes that the content of a signed
message is immutable, i.e., it is impossible to alter a signed
message, as it is not time-dependent. This hidden integrity
assumption prevents reasoning about situations where the
content of a SignedMessage is changed over time by an
attacker, thereby hiding potential architectural weaknesses.
As a more subtle example, consider the following defini-
tion of an invocation.
77 sig Invocation { ...
78 executed: one Time // was ‘‘lone’’
79 }
It implies that every invocation is executed at exactly one
time. In other words, this model implicitly assumes that all
invocations will eventually be executed (so deadlock is not
possible), the connector containing that invocation can not
fail (e.g., because of denial of service), there is always a time
when the receiving component is available (and, a fortiori,
there is a node hosting that component) and, if the sender is
a component hosted on another node, the link between both
nodes is available.
The above examples clarify how easy it is to introduce
implicit assumptions in an architectural design and that the
security implications can be far-reaching. Generally, hidden
assumptions can be avoided on two levels. The first level
is procedural, and consists of enforcing certain relaxation
rules, described later. The second level is structural, and
consists of embedding the relaxation rules in the meta-
model (to a large extent). This way, whenever a model is
created in conformance to the meta-model, many hidden
assumptions can be avoided by construction. This is an
advantage for the modeller, as enforcing the relaxation rules
can be challenging, especially for large-scale systems.
A. Relaxation rules
While it is hard to provide completeness criteria for these
relaxation rules, practise has shown that the following rules
avoid introducing hidden assumptions in new models. Avoid
over-constraining the cardinality of relationships. Both con-
nectors and links should connect an arbitrary (i.e., 0..∗)
number of components, resp. nodes, by default. This permits
reasoning about confidentiality and availability issues, such
situations where a connector fails and does not connect the
necessary components, or where an unforeseen component
is accidentally connected. Second, avoid over-constraining
the number of instances of components and nodes. It should
be possible to have too few (e.g., no logger is present in the
system), as well as too many instances (e.g., there are two
loggers) of every type. This relates to availability and, to a
lesser degree, integrity issues. Third, do not assume that
relationships are constant throughout time. This prevents
reasoning about situations where component attributes are
altered, or entities are spoofed. This rule mainly relates
to integrity issues. Fourth, avoid making timing assump-
tions. This includes liveness assumptions (i.e., assuming
that something will happen in every model instance) and
atomicity assumptions (i.e., assuming that two events happen
atomically). This rule mainly relates to availability issues,
and in a lesser degree to integrity issues (race conditions
etc.). Last, avoid assuming that events are ordered, such as
assuming that invocations are delivered in order. This mainly
relates to integrity issues, including race conditions.
B. Supporting relaxation via the meta-model
Correctly applying these relaxation guidelines might be
cumbersome for the modeller. Fortunately, most of the model
relaxation rules are embedded at the meta-model level, so
that they are fulfilled by construction, making the model
relaxation process as transparent as possible. This is done
as follows. First, the relationships between different meta-
model elements are not constrained in cardinality, e.g., a
connector can connect an arbitrary amount of components.
Additionally, wherever applicable, cardinalities are general-
ized to ‘lone’ (0..1) as opposed to ‘one’. This is the case
for Invocations, that might be invoked (at a lone Time) and
might be executed (at a lone Time). Second, the amount
of instances one type can have is not constrained in the
meta-model. Third, all relevant relationships defined in the
meta-model are time-dependent, except for the attributes of
Invocation. However, the equivalence relationship defined
between Invocations fulfills a similar role, as an invocation
with altered arguments will be considered equivalent to
the original one. Fourth, the only timing assumption built-
in to the meta-model is that an Invocation can only be
executed after it is invoked. However, not all Invocations
are necessarily invoked, and an invoked Invocation is not
necessarily executed. Fifth, Connectors do not guarantee in-
order invocation delivery (or even delivery at all, for that
matter). All this ensures that “vanilla” instantiations of the
meta-model are relaxed as per Section III-A.
Once the modeller introduces custom types and addi-
tional constraints in a model, some rules can no longer
be enforced on the meta-model level only. Ultimately, the
modeller is responsible for not overly constraining the model
description, e.g., the modeller should take care that newly
introduced component attributes are mutable by making
them time-dependent. This is where the relaxation rules
should be applied manually. However, it is possible to
facilitate enforcing these relaxation rules by means of pattern
matching tools (e.g., scan a model description for attribute
definitions, and verify that they are time dependent). This is
not addressed in this paper.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE MODEL ANALYSIS
In order to be usable in practise, the modelling approach
needs to be integrated in a constructive process. This is
discussed next.
A. Creating an initial model context
In Alloy, asserting whether a property holds corresponds
to trying to find examples where the negation of that property
holds. The properties of interest to us are the security
requirements. Given a requirement R, the Alloy Analyzer
will try to find model instances where ¬R is true. If such
an instance is found, then that instance is effectively the
abstraction of an attack on the model. If no such instance is
found, R holds for all model instances, and the architectural
model is secure (within the scope of the analysis).
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Figure 4. Automatically generated visualisation in which a logged entry
is deleted.
When the NoDeletion requirement from the previous
Section is verified against our initial model, the tool finds an
attack in which a message is logged and simply deleted from
the log (i.e., removed from the Logger.contains relationship).
In order to mitigate this attack, the explicit assumption that
no logged entry can be deleted, needs to be added. This is
essentially the negation of the attack instance. As such, the
counterexample provided by the tool is an insightful means
to constructively extend the architectural model.
80 pred DeletionIsImpossible {
81 all l:Logger, t:Time − TO/last, s:SignedMessage |
82 s in l.contains.t ⇒ s in l.contains.(t.next)
83 }
When this predicate is added as a fact to the model,
deletion attacks are no longer generated. Instead, the Alloy
Analyzer finds other counterexamples where the invocation
to log a message is never processed by the logger, one where
the connector buffering the invocation breaks down before
the log-invocation is processed, one where a connector
is used by the shop before the logger is connected, one
where log calls are routed trough insecure connectors (even
though secure connectors exist) and one where invocations
are tampered with (i.e., their arguments modified) while
transmitted. Analogous to the previous paragraph, facts are
added to the model until no additional counterexamples are
generated. This iterative process results in the following
context, which contains both assumptions on the model
instance-level and on the meta-model-level.
84 fact Context {
85 DeletionIsImpossible
86 AtLeastOnceInvocationSemantics
87 LogConnectorsAreReliable
88 LogConnectorsCorrectlyInitialized
89 LogCallsCorrectlyRouted
90 LogConnectorsAreTamperProof
91 }
Next to the DeletionIsImpossible assumption, this context
assumes that the middleware on which the system is built
should support at-least-once invocation semantics, so that the
logger receives at least one call per invocation of the log-
operation. Furthermore, connectors between the shop and log
should be reliable (i.e., they do not become unavailable after
a set of components is connected), protect the integrity of
invocations “in transit”, and be correctly initialized (i.e., used
only after both the shop and log are connected). Additionally,
invocations of the log-operation should be routed through
these connectors. This corresponds, e.g., to web applications
that, while they support HTTPS, also accept HTTP-calls,
rendering surfing sessions of oblivious end users insecure.
Having a sufficiently relaxed model is key for reasoning
about what model instances are possible within the minimal
guarantees that the modelled deployment environment offers.
Every model instance allowed within this space (i.e., config-
urations of both anticipated and unanticipated components,
which exhibit arbitrary behaviour unless explicitly forbidden
by some statement in the model description) that violates the
requirements is considered as a possible attack.
At this point, it is up to the security expert to decide
which parts of the context are trivially true and do not need
further attention (i.e., they are accepted) or those that need to
be mitigated. Mitigation is done by refining and extending
the model with security mechanisms. We argue that it is
easier to assess whether a certain deployment environment
offers a specific guarantee (positive perspective), than trying
to anticipate all possible attacker behaviour in advance
(negative perspective). And, when the security expert is
unable to easily assess whether a specific guarantee holds
in the deployment environment, it is possible to selectively
refine parts of the model to facilitate the assessment, as
shown next.
B. Refining the model context
Although the initial context presented above might be
acceptable in some circumstances (for instance, when the
log is written to a “write once read many” medium such as
a CD-R, the assumption DeletionIsImpossible is guaranteed
by construction), we will continue from the premise that
it is not. In order to refine the context, the part of the
model related to the unacceptable assumptions is refined
by adding a countermeasure. In this case, the Logger is
fitted with a counter, and every ProcessedMessage receives
a sequence number between 0 and the value of that counter,
which is subsequently incremented. Note that the security
requirements to be verified remain unchanged, as they are
expressed in terms of the interface of the system, while the
mentioned refinement deals with the component internals.
The original course-grained, unacceptable assumption
(line 85) is removed from the context, and is refined by
means of the guidance provided by the attacks produced by
the Alloy Analyzer (lines 92–95).
92 fact Context {
93 AssumeTamperproofNextUID
94 LoggerSignaturesCannotBeForged
95 ShopUsesSameLogger
96 LoggerDoesNotOverwriteEntries
97 AtLeastOnceInvocationSemantics
98 LogConnectorsAreReliable
99 LogConnectorsCorrectlyInitialized
100 LogCallsCorrectlyRouted
101 }
First, the logger should protect the integrity of the next
sequence number to be assigned. Second, signatures of
logged entries can not be forged (i.e., if the signed message
contents differ from the actual contents, the message signer
has to be different as well). This corresponds to assuming
that the signature algorithm is secure, which entails that
key management happens in a tamper-proof fashion. If the
modeller is not sure about the validity of this assumption,
it should be refined further. This is not done here due to
space constraints. Third, the shop should make sure to use
the same logger throughout time. This corresponds to an
integrity assumption on a component attribute, as is the
case in the first assumption. Fourth, the logger does not
overwrite older entries. This corresponds with an assumption
of trust in the logger component—the specified behavioural
description is complete, and the logger will not exhibit
additional functionality. The architectural-specific part of the
context remains unchanged.
The completeness of the context is trivially verified by
the Alloy Analyzer—if no counterexample is found, then the
context is complete. In order to verify whether the context
(or the model itself) is not overly restrictive, it is important
to verify that the model still has instances by effectively
generating an example instance. As long as the context is
not complete, new assumptions are added one-by-one as new
counterexamples emerge.
As the context is built incrementally starting from the
counterexamples provided by the tool, it is possible that too
many explicit assumptions have been added along the way.
In order to verify that the context is minimal, the Alloy
Analyzer can be used to verify that the removal of any single
assumption from the context results in an attack. Note that
this only verifies that the context is minimal with respect to
the granularity with which the assumptions are expressed—it
is possible that a coarse-grained assumption a can be refined
in two finer grained assumptions a = a1 ∨a2 of which only
one is necessary. While we have considered normalizing the
assumptions to, for instance, a normal form in order to find
the absolute minimal set of assumptions within the current
level of abstraction of the model, we have chosen not to do
this, as it is much harder to interpret normalized assumptions
and assess their inherent risk.
By assessing the risk inherent in taking every explicit
assumption for granted, the architect receives direct feed-
back of where security mechanisms are lacking (i.e., the
risk inherent to accepting that assumption is too high) or
where additional architectural refinement is required (i.e.,
the risk inherent to accepting that assumption is unclear).
This provides the necessary hooks to further integrate our
approach in a complete risk management process. However,
this aspect of the approach is out of scope for this paper.
The previous discussion assumes that the modeller is
creating a context in which the system will operate correctly
in a top-down fashion. Conversely, it is also possible to use
an existing, pre-packaged model (i.e., a profile) which corre-
sponds to the actual deployment environment of the system,
and verify whether the architectural model combined with
this pre-packaged context results in a secure configuration.
For instance, a profile can be developed for the security
guarantees provided by a specific middleware (e.g., in-order
message delivery, at least once invocation semantics, tamper-
proof links). Consider an environment with SSL-protected
connectors. This would result in the following predicate
provided by the profile (to be added to the context).
102 pred SSL {
103 all c:Connector {
104 c.receiversAuthenticated and c.deleteProof
105 c.tamperProof and c.callersAuthenticated
106 }}
When deployed in such an environment, our experiments
show that to minimize the online shop context lines 97–99
can be safely removed.
V. DISCUSSION
The types of assumptions that can be uncovered (and
dually the type of security properties that can be analyzed)
depend on the information incorporated in the model and,
hence, on the view types described in Section II-A. The
current model can unveil integrity issues, as all component
attributes as well as invocations are mutable; availability
issues, as the number of element instances is unconstrained;
timing-related issues such as deadlock, liveness and synchro-
nization issues, as the model implicitly supports parallelism
(i.e., multiple invocations can be made per time instance,
and under-constrained parts of the model exhibit arbitrary
behaviour). The only caveat is that predicates are treated
atomically—if an operation is encoded in a single predicate,
its execution will be implicitly atomic.
To verify that non-trivial types of weaknesses can be un-
covered, we compare our approach to Microsoft’s STRIDE
[4], which is a well-known and adopted approach in industry.
STRIDE uses a data-flow oriented view on the system (data
flow diagrams) and a checklist of generic threat templates,
called threat tree patterns. By encoding the converse of each
STRIDE threat which is applicable to the meta-model (e.g.,
spoofing external entities or tampering with data flows) as
an assertion and verifying that the Alloy Analyzer finds
counterexamples, we illustrate that we achieve at a minimum
the same level of analysis. The full set of assertions is
included in the online Alloy files. As an example, as data
flows are realized via operation invocations in our meta-
model, denial of service against a data flow is encoded as
follows:
107 assert InvocationsCanNotFail {
108 all c1,c2:Component | some p:Principal,op:Operation,
109 t1,t2:Time,if:Interface {
110 op in if.methods and c2 in if.realizedBy
111 Invoke[c1,c2,op,none,p,t1] ⇒ Execute[c1,c2,op,none,p,t2]
112 }}
The main advantage of our approach over checklist-based
approaches (such as STRIDE) is twofold. First, weaknesses
uncovered by this approach are necessarily relevant to the
specific security requirements of the modelled architecture.
On the contrary, during a checklist-based analysis, the
relevance of each generic threat must be assessed in the
specific context of the analysed system. Second, the ap-
proach abstracts away attacker behaviour by reasoning about
the minimal assumptions that are expected to hold in the
deployment environment. This is not so in approaches with
an explicit attacker model, in which the possible behaviour
of an attacker is fixed.
The usability of this approach is influenced by four
factors. First, because Alloy enables verification of incom-
pletely specified models, even very small initial models can
already be used for initial verification. Second, due to the
nature of the context refinement process, design effort is
focussed on the security-critical parts of the architecture.
Fine-grained refinement (possibly down to the level of de-
tailed design) is only required in high-risk situations (when
an assumption is unacceptable), justifying the additional
effort. This is the case with the next sequence number in
the logger component from Section IV-B. Third, because
the requirements are expressed in terms of the component
interfaces, it is possible to hierarchically validate a complex
system bottom-up: once a subsystem is validated and its
assumptions accepted, the requirements of that subsystem
can be added as assumptions on a higher hierarchical level.
However, studying this hierarchical verification is part of
ongoing work. Fourth, the effort required to translate ar-
chitectural documentation to Alloy can be limited using
automated model transformations. Given a proper subset of
UML diagrams adhering to the meta-model presented in
Section II-C, it is possible to largely automate the translation
to Alloy. This translation is also part of ongoing work.
The scalability of applying this approach is influenced
mainly by the run-time verification overhead. Verification
performance can be traded off with the exhaustiveness of the
analysis via the scope supplied to the Alloy analyzer. Early
in the modelling process, smaller scopes can uncover the
simpler attacks (the “low-hanging fruit”) almost in real-time.
Later in the validation process, larger scopes can potentially
find very complex attacks, while requiring considerably
more verification time. The approach is also made more
scalable by limiting verification effort to the security-critical
parts of the architecture, and by hierarchically validating
subsystems, as mentioned earlier.
VI. RELATED WORK
The idea of eliciting and documenting assumptions made
during the software engineering process to avoid bugs,
is not new. Fickas et al. note that not only requirement
fulfilment should be monitored, but also the assumptions
under which the system is designed [9]. Wile shows how
assumptions can be seen as a form of residual requirements,
which remain after an architecture is created to realise a
set of original requirements [10]. Roeller et al. give an
overview of assumption elicitation in software engineering
in [11]. In that work, the authors describe a methodology
to recover assumptions made on a technical, organizational
and management level, based on analyzing various sources
such as interviews, financial reports, version control and
source code. Khan et al. observe that software also has
to be assessed relative to the context in which it will
be deployed [12]. However, as far as we are aware, no
methodology exists to (largely) automate the uncovering of
context-dependent security assumptions on an architectural
level, while providing formal guarantees that the resulting
architecture is correct.
Assumptions also exist on the requirements level. Haley
et al. claim that adequate security requirements are well de-
fined, explicitly take assumptions into account, and provide
satisfaction arguments [13]. We support this by formally
encoding requirements as assertions, documenting assump-
tions in the context, and providing satisfaction arguments
by means of model validation. According to KAOS [14], an
assumption (or expectation) is a goal assigned to a single
agent in the software environment that, unlike requirements,
can not be enforced by the software-to-be. This is similar to
our approach. However, we have a more narrow scope for
assumptions by targetting only the software architecture and
provide a constructive method to uncover these assumptions.
The results of our analysis, i.e. unmitigated assumptions, can
be mapped to obstacles in KAOS. How we find assump-
tions is compatible with KAOS, where an obstacle tree is
constructed by negating a goal G, and then finding as many
AND/OR refinements of ¬G as possible.
The architectural modelling approach most closely related
to our approach is the software specification and analysis
method (SAM) [3]. SAM focusses on creating a formal
architectural representation for simulation, reachability anal-
ysis, model checking and interactive proving of architectural
properties, but does not help in eliciting assumptions. While
our approach supports simulation, model finding and verifi-
cation of generic properties (within the limits of the Alloy
Analyzer), this is not its primary objective.
Using model relaxation techniques on the resulting models
is also not new (although rarely used in software engineer-
ing). Engler et al. leverage model relaxation and under-
constrained execution in software testing [15]. They use
these techniques to provide dynamic tools with an ability
equivalent to static analysers, by enabling the tools to exe-
cute arbitrary functions, without prior setup or environmental
modelling. Similarly, our approach does not require an
explicit list of initial model states, or to list all possible
model transitions. This allows reasoning about situations
where the architecture would not be initialised correctly, or
where an attacker finds a model transition that the architect
did not foresee (e.g., by code injection).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a light-weight formal approach which
leverages model finding techniques to analyze a software
architecture and uncover non-trivial types of security weak-
nesses. The presented approach is constructive in the sense
that it provides easy-to-understand counterexamples that
make the process of fixing the discovered security issues
easier. Furthermore, as a byproduct of the approach, the
resulting formal model supports traceability (via the so-
called context) of the assumptions made by the modeller
on the deployment environment of the system.
Ongoing research extends this work in two dimensions.
First, in order to facilitate the integration in a secure develop-
ment life cycle, tool support for automated translation from
UML to Alloy (and back) is being investigated, as well as
hierarchical model refinement. Second, we are looking into
extending the meta-model to include other architectural view
types, such as including a data flow view by extending the
model with epistemic constructs. This, in turn, will allow
us to analyze more properties. These two extensions will be
validated on a larger case study.
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